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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the feasibility of profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts in 
presence of moral hazard between the principal (financier) and the agent 
(entrepreneur). It shows that introducing a rule for sharing profits and losses in 
contingence with the outcome of the entrepreneur’s project enlarges the feasibility 
region of the PLS contracts by enabling more entrepreneurs to access external 
financing. More specifically, in the contingent profit and loss sharing contract        
(C-PLS) losses are shared according to the capital participation of each party. But, 
in case of success, the entrepreneur receives a higher share of the profit which is 
endogenously determined according to the opportunity cost of capital of the 
financier (risk-free rate of return) and the characteristics of the project. It is also 
interestingly shown that having two subsequent C-PLS contracts where the second-
period expected profit of the entrepreneur is positively correlated to the first-period 
probability of success, has an even more incentive effect when the entrepreneur is 
sufficiently fore-sighted and the size of the project inferior to a determined 
threshold. Finally, the developed framework sets the rationale for a list of policy 
recommendations to enhance the use of the C-PLS contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is well known that one of the explanations of the low use by the Islamic banks of the profit 
sharing modes of finance is the difficulty to deal with the agency problems (moral hazard and 
adverse selection). According to Ul Haque and Mirakhor (1987, p161) “bankers ascribe the 
problem of moral hazard or asymmetric information to be an important explanation for 
individual preference for short-term liquidity.” The agency problems inherent to the equity 
contracts cannot be implemented without the costly monitoring of the agent. This is the main 
rationale for the dominance of debt over equity. Indeed, the classical literature on debt contract 
optimality under costly state verification (e.g. Townsend, 1979 and Gale and Hellwig, 1985), 
debt contracts minimize the monitoring costs.  But this result is due to the assumption of 
deterministic monitoring in case of equity contracts. In Al-Suwailem (2005), the asymmetric 
information regarding the realized output of the entrepreneur’s project is revealed by the 
financier through a random auditing strategy. This strategy reduces the higher monitoring cost 
of the equity contract. Consequently, equity contract Pareto-dominates the debt contract for a 
determined range of the financier’s opportunity cost. The range of this Pareto dominance 
increases with the project’s probability of success as well as with the bankruptcy cost. Trester 
(1998) develops a four-period model trying to explain why venture capitalists use equity rather 
than debt to finance entrepreneurial projects. The author considers a framework where 
information is initially symmetric between the risk-neutral entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist. However, subsequent asymmetric information about the payoff of the project arises 
with a non-null probability which is the case when the entrepreneur learns the status of the 
project one period before the venture capitalist. In this case, it is shown that debt contract may 
be infeasible and leads to the use of preferred equity contracts. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the foreclosure option of the debt contract may incentivize the entrepreneur to behave 
opportunistically which reduces the expected return of the venture capitalist.  
 
      The objective of this paper is to suggest a new type of profit and loss sharing contracts - 
we call it Contingent Profit and Loss Sharing contracts (C-PLS) – in order to enhance their 
feasibility and endow the financial institutions with a new direction of product development 
to increase their offer of equity finance. The C-PLS is based on a simple intuition which is to 
link the share of the entrepreneur in the project’s payoff to the ex-post realized performance. 
The C-PLS contract initially signed by the two parties (financier and entrepreneur) stipulates 
that losses are shared according to the capital participation of each party. But, in case of 
success the entrepreneur receives a higher share of the profit. The characteristics of the 
contract are endogenously determined (depending on the opportunity cost of capital of the 
financier - risk-free rate of return - and the characteristics of the entrepreneur’s project). We 
show that introducing a rule for sharing profits and losses contingent on the outcome of the 
entrepreneurs’ projects enlarges the feasibility region of the classical PLS contracts by 
enabling more entrepreneurs to access external financing. The framework considers the 
presence of moral hazard which manifests as the hidden effort undertaken by the 
entrepreneur. 
 
      Although the idea of conditioning the shares of the PLS contract on the project’s 
performance is not new per se and has been authorized by the Sharia scholars
i
, it has not 
attracted the attention of the researchers in Islamic economics. In our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to apply this rule in a theoretical model and assess its impact on the feasibility of 
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the PLS contract in presence of moral hazard. In addition to that, the paper is distinguished 
from the existing studies by analyzing the C-PLS contract in a general context along two 
dimensions. The first dimension is enabling the internal funds provided by the entrepreneur to 
vary between null and a level just inferior to 100%.  The justification of considering this more 
general dimension is the intuition that the opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur is less 
likely to happen when his own investment is higher. The second dimension is the extension of 
the time horizon of the financial relationship to two periods.  
 
      I show that the C-PLS contract have a larger feasibility region then the PLS contract since 
it enables the access to finance to more entrepreneurs. But still there are minimum required 
internal funds to be invested by the entrepreneur for his project to be financed. This threshold 
depends on the characteristics of the project (size, payoffs, and probability of success/failure) 
and the opportunity cost of the financier. But the level of the required internal funds is lower 
for the C-PLS contract relatively to the necessary level under the PLS one and is further lower 
in the case of a two-period relationship if the entrepreneur is sufficiently foresighted. Indeed, 
in this case the incentive for the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the first 
period is even much more important since he is not only concerned by the cash-flow generated 
in the first-period, but also by increasing his share in the second period project. The higher the 
cash-flow generated in the first period, the higher its share during the second period. In the 
policy recommendation section, I discuss the ability of taxing the “risk-free” (or debt-like) 
financial operations and subsidizing the “higher effort” of the insufficiently-capitalized 
entrepreneurs on favoring the financial access.   
 
      The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. 
Section 3 characterizes the C-PLS contract in the context of a one-period relationship. Section 
4 characterizes the C-PLS contract in the context of a two-period relationship. Section 5 
provides numerical examples that illustrate the theoretical results. In section 6, I discuss some 
policy implications of the model. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
 
I analyze the feasibility of building the contracting relationship between the risk-neutral 
financier and entrepreneur based on the C-PLS contract. This is considered in the presence of 
moral hazard due to the inability of the principal (financier) to observe the effort undertaken 
by the agent (entrepreneur) after the signature of the C-PLS contract. The entrepreneur is 
endowed with internal funds but needs complementary external funding to undertake the 
investment project. In section 3, I study the relationship in the context of one-period whereas a 
two-period relationship is considered in section 4.  
 
2.1 Economic environment 
 
 
A risk-neutral entrepreneur operates a firm which generates a stochastic output: a high 
level and a low level . The probability e of realization of the high output depends on the 
effort level e  undertaken by the entrepreneur. This effort is a private information of the 
entrepreneur and cannot be observed by the risk-neutral financier.  However, the latter can 
observe perfectly the output of the firm. The relationship between the entrepreneur and the 
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financier is analyzed in the context of sharing (equity) contract or more precisely the new 
suggested C-PLS contract.  
 
2.2 Entrepreneur 
 
A risk-neutral entrepreneur is endowed with a technology that produces a stochastic output 
according to the following distribution 
  with a probability of 
  with a probability of 1
e
e
 

 

 

 (1) 
where   and   represent respectively the high level and low level of output respectively 
verifying 0  <  . The probability e  is depending on the level of effort 
 ,e h l undertaken by the entrepreneur such that the realization of the higher profit is more 
likely when the high level of effort h  takes place: 1 0h l    . The disutility of the effort is 
captured through the costs hc  and lc  verifying 0h lc c  which means that the higher the 
effort the higher the cost for the entrepreneur. The investment funds needed to operate the firm 
are represented by F . The entrepreneur is initially endowed with an amount  0,f F  which 
means that he needs complementary external funds of F f in order to operate the firm. We 
denote by  0 /x F f F   the share of capital provided by the financier. The remainder share 
provided by the entrepreneur is therefore 01 x . We assume that the expected output of the 
firm is superior to the investment F only in case of higher effort: 
 
 +(1 )
 +(1 )
h
h h
l
l l
E F
E F


   
   
  
  
 (2) 
 
      Since the entrepreneur is assumed to be risk-neutral he increases his utility by maximizing 
his end of period output after payment of the financier’s share and supporting the cost of 
effort. 
 
Assumption1. If the entrepreneur could self-finance the firm then he would chose the higher 
level of effort. This is equivalent to the following condition 
  h l h l h lE E c c            (3) 
which signifies that the additional expected revenue resulting from the higher effort exceeds 
the additional cost.  
 
2.3 Financier 
 
A risk-neutral financier requires an expected rate of return equal to 0 1   which is the 
available return on “risk-free” (or debt-like) financial operations. Therefore, the expected 
payoff of the financier, generated from the investment project, should be equal to 0(1 )x F . 
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While the financier cannot observe the entrepreneur’s effort, he observes without cost the 
firm’s output and can infer the entrepreneur’s effort choice from the latter’s utility 
maximization problem.  
 
 
Assumption2. The expected return of the investment project is higher than the risk-free return 
if and only if the higher level of effort is undertaken, i.e.: 
1
l hE E
F F
     (4) 
3. A one-period C-PLS contract 
 
 
I consider a one-period relationship which begins at date  0t   and finishes at date  1t  .             
The entrepreneur and the financier agree on a partnership contract 0 0( , , )x F x   whereby 
the entrepreneur commits to undertake the high level of effort ( )e h and invests an amount 
 01f x F  whereas the financier finances the firm by providing an amount 0F f x F  . 
The contract stipulates also that the financier receives a share  ( 0x  ) of the output and the 
entrepreneur receives a share is 1   (1 )  in case of success (failure) of the project. We are 
looking for a sharing contract such that   which means that the financier’s share in case 
of success is lower than its share in case of failure of the project. Given this specification, it is 
clear that in case of failure of the project (realization of the low level of the output ) the 
financier (entrepreneur) receives a share 0x  ( 01 x ) equal to its initial participation to the 
capital. For the C-PLS contract to be fully characterized we need to determine the share .  
 
3.1. Symmetric information 
 
 
In case of symmetric information, the financier observes the effort of the entrepreneur who 
cannot deviate from its contractual engagement to undertake the high level of effort. In this 
case, the share * that procures the financier an expected rate of return of  is given by: 
* *
0E(W *)  +(1- ) (1 )
inv
h h x F          (5) 
Or equivalently  
 
 
*
0 0
0
*
0
1
( ) [1 ]
           1 (1 )
             
h
h
h
h
E F
x x
x
F
x
 
 
  
 

 
 
     
 
 
(6) 
      This expression shows that if the high expected return /hE F  of the project equals the 
risk-free return 1   then * * 0x   . Otherwise, if the high expected return exceeds the 
risk-free return then the financier accepts a lower share * *   in case of success of the 
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project. It is also clear that the share *  in case of success (realization of the high output ) 
increases with the amount of the external financing 0x F . It also increases with the risk-free 
rate of return  . However, the share of the financier decreases when the project become safer. 
Indeed, it decreases with hE , the higher expected return of the project as well as with h , the 
probability of success  in case of high effort. The entrepreneur utility is given by  
 
   * *E(W *) 1  +(1- ) 1ent h h hc          (7) 
3.2. Asymmetric information 
 
Assume that the financier offers to the entrepreneur the contract *0( , , )x F   but the 
entrepreneur deviates from its commitment to undertake the higher effort ( e h ) and performs 
the lower effort  e l . In case of asymmetric information, this deviation is not observable by 
the financier and could not be inferred from the observation of the output. Indeed, the lower 
output    could occur even in the case of higher effort with a probability1 h . Undertaking 
the lower effort just increases the probability of failure from 1 h  to1 l .  
 
 
Assumption 4. If the entrepreneur is indifferent between the lower and higher effort then he 
will fulfills his commitment and will undertake the higher effort  e h . 
 
Let’s now analyze in which case the deviation of the entrepreneur could occur. 
 
Lemma 1. The entrepreneur has an incentive to undertake the higher effort  e l  if his 
capital participation in the firm 0(1 )x  exceeds (1 )x where x is given by 
   
   
  1 ( )
h lE E c c
h l
x x
h F
h l
 

   
  
 
  
 (8) 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
      This lemma signifies that the additional cost of effort borne by the entrepreneur ( h lc c ) is 
lower than his additional expected revenues if he invests at least (1 )x F . Otherwise, 
(i.e. 01 1x x   ) the sharing contract 
*
0( , , )x F    is not an incentive-compatible contract 
since the entrepreneur will be incited to shirk and undertake the lower effort  e l . Figure 1 
shows that the C-PLS contract is not feasible in case of total external financing of the project 
0( 1)x  . However, it becomes feasible when the internal funds of the entrepreneur are 
sufficiently higher1 1x x   . 
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Figure 1. Additional benefit and cost resulting from undertaking higher effort 
 
      Figure 1 illustrates also that differentiating the financier’s share by fixing a lower share in 
case of success of the project *( )  enlarges the region of feasibility of the C-PLS contract 
relatively to the classical PLS contract which corresponds to the particular case  *( )  .             
In other words, the C-PLS contract has a higher feasibility than the classical PLS contract. The 
justification of this result rests naturally on the additional incentive to the entrepreneurs 
endowed with insufficient internal resources to undertake the higher effort.  
 
Proposition 1.  
 
i) If 0x x  then the C-PLS contract 
*
0( , , )x F   provides the financier with an expected rate 
of return of  .  
ii) If 0x x  then 
   ii-1) Under the C-PLS contract *0( , , )x F   the entrepreneur chooses the lower  effort and 
the financier’s expected  rate of return is .   
ii-2) If 0 ˆmax( , )x x x x   then the C-PLS contract which provides the financier with an 
expected rate of return  is  0 ˆ( , , )x F   where ˆ verifies: 
 
 * *
0
1
ˆ 1
l
F
x

   
 
 
     
 
 (9) 
0x  
  h l
h lE E
    
 
 
0  1  
Additional cost 
c c
h l
  
*( )x    
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
  (1 )h l h
h
E F  

    
Additional benefit 
  * *(1 ) (1 )h l            
*   
*   
*( )x    
*1 ( )x     
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 
ˆ
1
l
l
x
F
 
  

 
 (10) 
 *
0
h l
x F
 
    
 
   
   
(11) 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the possible payoffs of the financier under the two C-PLS contracts 
*
0( , , )x F    and 0 ˆ( , , )x F    . The payoff of the entrepreneur could be derived geometrically 
as the difference between the 45
o
 line and the payoff of the financier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Payoff of the financier according to the three feasible C-PLS contracts 
 
      Figure 3 illustrates the different regions presented in proposition 1 under the condition that 
the financier requires an expected rate of return of  . In the region  0, x
 
the entrepreneur 
does not require large external financing and has an incentive to undertake the higher effort. In 
this case, the share of the financier is * . However, for 0x x  
the amount of entrepreneur’s 
financing is not higher enough and the entrepreneur has an incentive to shirk and undertakes 
the lower effort. 
 
 
 
  
0  
Payoff of 
 the financier 
    
*   
*   
ˆ  
*
0x   
*
0( )x  ˆ  
  
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      Figure 3. Feasibility and characteristics of the C-PLS contract according to the external financing needs 
 
      For this reason, the financier offers in the region  ˆ,max( , )x x x
 
the C-PLS contract 
0
ˆ( , , )x F   whereby he requires a higher share (
*ˆ  ) of the payoff in case of success of the 
project. This result is intuitive since in order for the financier to keep constant its expected 
return at  he has to overcome the decreasing of the probability of success (from h
 
to l ) by 
increasing its share in the outcome from 
*  toˆ . In the region  ˆmax( , ),1x x  the external 
financing required by the entrepreneur is extremely higher so that no C-PLS contract is 
feasible due to the inability of the financier to incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the 
higher effort, or to increase its share to the level that generates an expected return equal to the 
risk-free rate of return. 
 
4. C-PLS contracts in a two-period relationship 
 
 
The characteristics of the entrepreneur are identical to those described in section 2. He is 
initially (  0t  ) endowed with an amount of capital equal to  01f x F  .  At the beginning 
of the second period he reinvests any cash-flow  11 x F  generated from the first-period 
project in the new project. It is particularly interesting to analyze if extending the horizon of 
the relationship to two periods will incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort 
and consequently, if it enlarges the region of financial access. Indeed, as illustrated by figure 
3, if the initial amount  01f x F   of capital endowment of the entrepreneur is inferior to 
ˆ(1 max( , ))x x F or equivalently if the required external financing is high and verifies the 
following condition 
 0 ˆmax( , ),1x x x  (15) 
then the entrepreneur could not benefit from external funding in the context of a one-period 
relationship and therefore he could not undertake his project. I will analyze if the extension of 
1 
0x  
0xˆ  0  
x  
No contract  0 ˆ( , , )x F    
*
0( , , )x F    
ˆ If x x  
1 
0x  
0  
No contract  *
0( , , )x F    
ˆ If x x  
x  
lower effort  higher effort  
higher effort  
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the time horizon to two periods and having two subsequent C-PLS contracts will enable the 
access to finance with lower constraint in regards to the initial funding.  Hence, the partnership 
between the financier and the entrepreneur covers now two periods. At the initial date  0t   
the two parties agree on two separate partnership contracts. At the beginning of the first period 
(  0t  ) the entrepreneur and the financier agree on a partnership contract 
0 1 1 0( , , )x F x   whereby the entrepreneur commits to undertake the high level of effort 
( )e h and participates with an amount of capital of  01f x F  whereas the financier 
finances the firm by providing an amount 0F f x F  . The entrepreneur commits to reinvest 
his share of the payoff during the second period so that the second partnership contract 
becomes 1 2 2 1( , , )x F x    where  
 
 
 
1
1
1
1     with prob 
1
1     with prob 1-
e
e
x F
  
  

  

 (16) 
      Condition (16) states that the self-financed capital of the entrepreneur during the second 
period arises from the payoff he receives at the end of the first period. We have also to ensure 
that even in the case the entrepreneur is incentivized to undertake the higher effort, the 
expected wealth of the financier in each period is equal to wealth he would obtain if he invests 
his capital in a risk-free asset. Therefore, the following conditions should hold: 
 
1 1 1 0E(W )  +(1 ) (1 )
inv
h h x F           (17) 
2 2 2 1E(W )  +(1- ) (1 )
inv
h h x F          (18) 
 
      Therefore, we obtain the following expressions of the shares that characterize the two C-
PLS contracts: 
*
1 0( )x   (19) 
*
2 1( )x   (20) 
      Where * 0( )x  is given by (6). Let’s note that at date  0t   the share 2  that characterizes 
the second-period partnership contract is not fully determined. Only its variation with the 
payoff  11 x F  according to (20) and (6) is known. Using (20), (16) and (6) we obtain the 
ex-ante (at  0t  ) expression of the share 2 1( )e e  which depends on the state of the nature 
that takes place at  1t   and the effort undertaken by the entrepreneur during the first period: 
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 
 
 
 
1
2
2 1
0
2
1
(1 ) (1 )     with prob 
( )
1
(1 ) (1 )    with prob 1-
up
h e
h
down
h e
h
F
F
F
e e
F x
F
F
 
    
 


    
 
 
   

  
     


 (21) 
      Given that the share 2 is decreasing with the payoff  (  or )   that takes place during the 
first period, it is possible that the entrepreneur will be incentivized to undertake the higher 
effort during the first period in order to maximize its second period payoff. Therefore, the 
decision of the entrepreneur should be analyzed by considering its expected inter-temporal 
discounted wealth 
11 2 2 1 2
( , ) ( , )ent enteEW e e c EW e e  
 
(22) 
where 1   is the entrepreneur’s discount factor. Equation (22) shows that the effort 
 1 ,e l h  undertaken by the entrepreneur requires a cost 1ec  and affects the expected wealth 
2 1 2( , )
entEW e e  during the second period since it impacts the probabilities of success and failure 
of the project and therefore the revenues that will be reinvested during the second period. 
Consequently, the effort undertaken by the entrepreneur during the first period impacts also 
the probabilities of the second’s period shares 2 2 or 
up down  .  
 
Proposition 2. The partnership over two periods enlarges the region of financial access to 
 0 ˆmax( , ),x x x x  and incentivizes the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort 
1 2( , )e h e h   if the latter is sufficiently foresighted and the size of the project inferior to a 
determined threshold: 
 
              If  
 
     If   max( , )
ˆ
F F
x x
F F F F
x x



 

 
  
 
 
where the thresholds , , ,  and x x F F  are defined in the appendix.
 
 
 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
      This result is intuitive signaling that if the entrepreneur does not put sufficient importance 
on the payoffs that he will obtain during the second period, then no additional incentive will 
result from the larger horizon of the relationship financier/entrepreneur. Meanwhile, even if 
the entrepreneur is sufficiently foresighted but the project’s size exceeds max( , )F F then the 
financier will not provide financing for the projects that are not financially feasible over a one-
period relationship.  
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5. Numerical Simulations  
 
I showed in proposition 1 that the C-PLS contract is feasible when the internal funds (provided 
by the entrepreneur) are superior to a determined threshold (see also figure 3). This threshold 
depends on the characteristics of the project (size, payoffs, and probability of success/failure) 
and the opportunity cost of the financier. In this section, I generate numerical simulations to 
illustrate the theoretical results and analyze the effect on the financial access of different 
parameters of the problem.  
 
5.1. Effect of the variation of the probability of success  
 
I consider a project of size F =200 which generate a high payoff 1.98F  in case of success 
and low payoff 0.22F  in case of failure. The probability of success in case of low effort is 
0.46l   and I vary the probability of success in case of high effort as follows  0.55;1h  .              
I consider that the risk-free rate of return is 5%   and the discount factor of the entrepreneur 
is 0.95  . Moreover, the cost of low effort is 0.1( )h llc E E    whereas the cost of high 
effort is 0.4( )h lhc E E   which ensures that condition (3) is satisfied. In addition to the 
variation of the probability of success h  in case of high effort I also vary the proportion 0x of 
external financing needs in the range  0.1%,100% . The following table summarizes the 
different values of the parameters while figures 6.a, 6.b, 7.a and 7.b illustrate the results of the 
simulations.   
 
5%   200F   0.22F   0.1( )h llc E E     0.55;1h   
0.95   0.46l   1.98F   0.4( )
h l
hc E E     0 0.1%,100%x   
 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Effort, financial access and the probability of 
success in case of one-period relationship. 
Figure 7. Effect of the external financing and the 
probability of success on the share ratio of 
the financier in case of one-period 
relationship. 
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    Figure 6 shows that C-PLS contract is not feasible when the external financial needs are 
superior to 45% of the cost of the project and the probability of success in case of higher effort 
is inferior to 0.8. In addition, it is clear that the higher effort is undertaken by the entrepreneur 
only for sufficiently level of the higher probability of success. This threshold is itself 
increasing with the external financing need which means that higher external needs may 
induce the entrepreneur to choose the lower effort whereas for the same type of projects 
another entrepreneur with higher internal funds chooses the higher effort.  Figure 7 illustrates 
the profit sharing ratio  .  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Effort, financial access and the probability of 
success in case of two-period relationship. 
Figure 9. Effect of the external financing and the probability 
of success on the share ratio of the financier in 
case of two-period relationship. 
 
      Comparing figures 6 and 8 it is clear that the relationship between the financier and the 
entrepreneur over two periods enlarges the region of feasibility of the C-PLS contract. It is 
also interesting to note that this longer relationship horizon induces the entrepreneur to choose 
the higher effort. Figure 9 shows that the financing cost of the C-PLS contract is reduced 
mainly due to the incentivizing effect of the larger horizon of the financial relationship 
pushing the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort.  
 
 5.2. Effect of the variation of the risk-free return  
 
I consider a project of size F =3000 which generate a high payoff 2.09F  in case of success 
and low payoff 0.001F  in case of failure. The probability of success in case of low effort 
is 0.45l   and the probability of success in case of high effort is 0.8h  . I vary the risk-free 
rate of return   in the interval 1%;30% . The discount factor of the entrepreneur is 0.95  . 
Moreover, the cost of low effort is 0.1( )h llc E E    whereas the cost of high effort is 
0.8( )h lhc E E   which ensures that condition (3) is satisfied. In addition to the variation of 
the risk-free rate of return  , I also vary the proportion 0x of external financing needs in the 
range  0.1%,100% . The following table summarizes the different values of the parameters 
while figures 10. and 11. illustrate the results of the simulations.   
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3000F   0.45l   0.001F   0.1( )
h l
lc E E     1%;30%  
0.95   0.8h   2.09F   0.8( )
h l
hc E E     0 0.1%,100%x   
 
 
 
Figure 10.. Effort, financial access and the risk-free return in 
case of one-period relationship. 
Figure 11. Effort, financial access and the risk-free return in 
case of two-period relationship. 
 
Again, figures 10 and 11 confirm the the positive effect of the longer horizon on the incentive 
of the entrepreneur to undertake higher effort and consequently on the enlargement of the 
region of access to finance. 
 
6. Policy implications 
 
From the results obtained in the context of one-period financial relationship (section 3) it is 
easy to note that it is possible to extend the use of the C-PLS contract by widening the 
financial access to the entrepreneurs through two policies or a mix of them. The first policy 
consists in subsidizing the cost of higher effort (The higher effort should be interpreted 
broadly and could reflect the use of a modern technology by the entrepreneur which 
necessitates additional expenses and learning process): 
 
 
P1) A special governmental fund subsidizing the undertaking of higher effort by the 
entrepreneurs endowed with low internal resources (case of MSMEs) could be one of the tools 
to implement this policy.  
 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the effect of this policy which reduces the minimum internal resources 
required for the entrepreneur to access external financing. These minimum resources decreases 
from 1 x  to 1
s
x . The second policy consists in reducing the opportunity cost of the 
financier which equals the risk-free rate of return  .  
 
P2) In order to encourage the C-PLS contract a higher taxation of the financier’s revenues 
generated through the “risk-free” financial operations could be adopted. 
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      Figure 13 illustrates the effect of taxation on the additional benefit of higher effort. The 
tax’s effect has been chosen (for explanation reason) to generate the same effect as the 
subsidizing policy, which is decreasing the minimum resources required for financial access 
from 1 x  to 1
s
x . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Effect of subsidizing the cost of higher effort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Effect of reducing the risk-free rate of return (through taxation for example) 
s
x  
( )h lc s c   
1
s
x  
0x  
Additional benefit 
  *(1 ) (1 )h l            
  h l      
0  1  
Additional cost 
h lc c  
x  
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
s
x  
1
s
x  
0x  
Additional benefit 
  *(1 ) (1 )h l              h l      
0  1  
Additional cost 
h lc c  
x  
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
16 
      A policy-mix consisting in a combination of taxing the “risk-free” financial operations and 
subsidizing of the “higher effort” has the advantage to reduce the amplitude of the adjustment 
made through each policy. As illustrated in figure 14, a combination of lower subvention of 
the higher effort compared to figure 12 and lower taxation compared to figure 13 generates the 
same effect (relatively to individual policy) on the enlargement of the region of financial 
access. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Effect of a mix-policy of subsidizing and taxation 
 
      The results obtained in the context of two-period financial relationship (section 4) show 
that it is possible to enlarge the region of financial access through extending the horizon of 
financial relationship from one to two periods. It has also been shown that for the larger 
horizon to have a positive impact, the entrepreneurs need to be sufficiently foresighted. In this 
context, a third policy recommendation can be done which is the following: 
 
P3) A governmental agency that accompanies the entrepreneurs with low financial resources, 
by providing them with economic incentives on a larger horizon is expected to have a positive 
externality on the financier-entrepreneur relationship. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper builds a theoretical model accompanied by numerical illustration setting the 
rationale for the development of new type of profit and loss sharing contract. The suggested 
Contingent Profit and Loss Sharing (C-PLS) contract includes an endogenous incentive 
mechanism which enable to reduce the negative impact of the moral hazard problem between 
the financier and the entrepreneur in a situation where the former cannot observe the effort 
s
x  
1
s
x  
0x  
Additional benefit 
  *(1 ) (1 )h l              h l      
0  1  
Additional cost 
h lc c  
x  
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
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undertaken by the latter. In the contingent profit and loss sharing contract (C-PLS) losses are 
shared according to the capital participation of each party. But, in case of success, the 
entrepreneur receives a higher share of the profit which is endogenously determined according 
the opportunity cost of capital of the financier (risk-free rate of return) and the characteristics 
of the project. This variety of the profit sharing contract although approved from a sharia 
compliance perspective many years ago has not been analyzed in any theoretical model 
dealing with the agency problems between a financier and an entrepreneur. Another originality 
of this paper relatively to the existing studies consists in enabling the internal funds provided 
by the entrepreneur to vary between null and a level just inferior to 100%.  This dimension is 
important because the entrepreneur’s (financier’s) share in the project’s payoff increases 
(decreases) with the internal funds. The paper showed that the C-PLS contract is feasible if the 
internal funds of the entrepreneur are superior to a minimum determined threshold. This 
threshold depends on the characteristics of the project (size, payoffs, and probability of 
success/failure) and the opportunity cost of the financier. I have also shown that the 
enlargement of the financial-relationship to two periods has an incentivizing effect on the 
entrepreneur and may increase the feasibility of the C-PLS contract enabling a larger access to 
finance.  This is the case if the entrepreneur is sufficiently foresighted so that he gives a 
minimum level of importance to his profits during the second period, and the size of the 
project does not exceed a determined threshold. In the policy recommendation section,               
I discussed the effects of taxing the “risk-free” (debt-like) financial operations and subsidizing 
the “higher effort” of the insufficiently-capitalized entrepreneurs and show that they can 
enlarge of the financial access and enhance the feasibility of the C-PLS contracts.   
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
 
The entrepreneur undertakes the lower level of effort after signing the contract if this increases his 
utility. This is the case if the following condition holds 
   * *E(W ) 1  +(1- ) 1 E(W *)ent entl l lc           (A1) 
Using (7) condition (A1) becomes 
  * *( ) (1 ) (1 )h l h lc c               (A2) 
Injecting the expression (6) of 
*  in (A2) and noting that * x   
 
* *( )h l
h l
c c
     
 

   

  
 
  * *
( )h l
h l
c c
     
 

   

 (A3) 
Let’s show that * *    . For that assume that * *     and let’s show that this is not possible. 
Multiplying the two members of this inequality by h  and adding 
*(1- )h    we 
obtain * * *(1 )h h          . Recalling that equation (5) gives 
* * +(1 ) (1 )h h xF          
we 
obtain that 
*(1 )xF    which becomes (1 )F    since * x  . This is clearly in 
contradiction with the assumption that F  . Therefore, we can now return to (A3) to obtain 
 
 
 
 * *( ) 1
h l h
h l
h l h
E E c c E F
x
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    
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equivalently
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Proof of Proposition 1 
 
i) From Lemma 1 we know that if (1 ) (1 )x x    then the entrepreneur will undertake the higher effort. 
In this case, the entrepreneur’s expected rate of return is identical to the case of symmetric information 
and equals  . 
ii-1) From Lemma 1 we know that if (1 ) (1 )x x    then the entrepreneur chooses the lower effort if 
he is offered the partnership contract * *( , , , )e h xF   . The expected rate of return of the financier is 
determined by the following equation 
* *E(W )  +(1- ) (1 )inv l l x F         (A4) 
Which gives us using (6) 
 * *h l
xF
 
     
 
   
 
 (A5) 
ii-2) For the expected rate of return of the financier to equal   although the entrepreneur chooses the 
lower effort we should have the following equation 
*ˆ ˆE(W )  +(1- ) (1 )inv l l x F        (A6) 
Recalling equation (5): 
* *E(W *)  +(1- ) (1 )inv h h xF           
 It is easy to show that  
 ** *ˆ  + h l hh l h
l l l
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    
 
   
(A7) 
From equation (6) we have       * 1 11
h
h h l
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E F F
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   
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     
  
 
Injecting this expression of 
*  in (A7) we found 
      
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(A8) 
However, we should ensure that ˆ 1   which is the case only if 
 
ˆ 1
1
l
l
x x
F
 
  
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 
. Since we 
are under the case x x  the possibility for the financier to offer this contract is conditioned by the 
following condition  ˆ,max( , )x x x x . From Lemma 1 we know that if (1 ) (1 )x x    then the 
entrepreneur chooses the lower effort if he is offered the partnership contract
* *( , , , )e h xF    since 
we have the inequality (A2) and given that *ˆ 
 
the same inequality (A2) holds for  ˆ
 
and the 
entrepreneur chooses the lower effort.  
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Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Before proving the results we need the following intermediary result which is easy to show using the 
equations (8) and (10). 
 
Lemma1.  
   if 
ˆax( , )
ˆ   if    
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m x x
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  and   / ( )h l h lA c c    
 
(A14) 
i) For the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the first period,  
1 2 1 2E(W \ , ) E(W \ , )
ent ente h e e l e  
 (A15) 
with
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(A16) 
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For the entrepreneur to choose the higher effort during the first period we have to obtain  
Using (A16) and (A17) the condition (A15) becomes 
 
 
2 2 1 2 1
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(A17) signifies that the additional effort cost should be more than compensated by the increase in the 
expected discounted wealth. From equation (22) we have 
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Injecting the last equation in (A17) we obtain 
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   
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We consider that the incentive for the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the second 
period holds ( 2e h ) therefore we obtain 
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which becomes 
 0x x x x x


   
 
(A19) 
with x  given by (8) and the rest of the variables are 
 
(1 )
h
x x
F
  
 

 
   
(A20) 
 (1 ) (1 )h
F
F

  

    (A21) 
Therefore, the partnership contract over two periods enlarges the region of financial access 
if ˆax( , )x m x x . Using lemma 2 this is equivalent to the following conditions  
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 
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             if   
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 (A22) 
Using (A20) and (10) it is easy to show that ˆ 0x x   is possible if and only if  
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 (A23) 
Therefore (A22) becomes 
             if   
    if   max( , )  
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F F
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 (A24) 
 
ii) Now, for the entrepreneur to choose the higher effort during the second period we have to ensure 
that the following condition holds: 
2 1 2 2 1 2( , ) ( , )
ent entW e h e h W e h e l    
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(A25) 
Let’s recall that equation (21) gives us  
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Therefore (A24) becomes  
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Or equivalently  1 h lx x x     where 1x  is defined by (17) and (20) and given by 
 
0 0
1
0
1 (1 )     with prob 
1                                   with prob 1
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Therefore the condition for the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort at the second period 
(whatever the state of the nature that occurs at the end of the first period) is the following 
01
x
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
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x x x 
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Let’s now note that ' 1x   if and only if   
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In other words if F F then the entrepreneur undertakes the higher effort uncondionally. However, if 
F F then the entrepreneur undertakes the higher effort only if 0 'x x . Finally, the different 
thresholds presented in proposition 3 are summarized in the following: 
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(A26) 
 
 
                                                 
i
 From the Shari’ah compliance point of view, the practice of incentivizing the agent in case of 
Mudharabah by increasing his share in the payoffs in case of success of the project, has been approved 
in the 2
nd
 Islamic Finance Conference in Kuwait and the fourth Shari’ah opinion of the first Al-Barakah 
Conference. For the Musharakah contract it is known that the sharing of the losses should be 
proportional to the capital participation of each party but the sharing of the profits could be different 
according to an initial agreement.   
